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GLOSSARY
AIS

Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) was defined by de Castro
and Timmis (2003) as “computational systems inspired
by theoretical immunology, observed immune functions,
principles and mechanisms in order to solve problems”

Anomaly

‘Anomaly’ or ‘non-self’ in the context of a network traffic
points to an instance which is a previously known or
unknown attack. An anomalous instance is designed to cause
intentional harm

Detection Rates

Wong, Ray, Stephens, and Lewis (2012) states detection
rates as “number of true positives divided by the number of
anomalous transactions tested”

False Negatives

Wong et al. (2012) states this to be “rate of transactions that
have been incorrectly identified as legitimate”

False Positives

Wong et al. (2012) states false positive rate as “the false
positives divided by the number of legitimate transactions
tested (false positives + true negatives)”

IDS

According to Kim et al. (2007), an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) detects unauthorized use, misuse and abuse of computer
systems by both system insiders and external intruders”.

IPS

An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) has a subtle difference
in comparison with an IDS. As stated by Kenkre, Pai, and
Colaco (2015), “IPS is used to actively drop packets of data
or disconnect connections that contain unauthorized data”

x
Normal

‘Normal’ or ‘self’ in the context of a network traffic points
to an instance which is not a previously known or unknown
attack. Normal instance is not supposed to cause intentional
or unintentional harm.

xi

ABSTRACT
Valayapalayam Kumaravel, Harish M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. An
Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System Based on Artificial Immune System
(AIS) Techniques . Major Professor: Phillip T. Rawles.
Two of the major approaches to intrusion detection are anomaly-based detection
and signature-based detection. Anomaly-based approaches have the potential for
detecting zero-day and other new forms of attacks. Despite this capability,
anomaly-based approaches are comparatively less widely used when compared to
signature-based detection approaches. Higher computational overhead, higher false
positive rates, and lower detection rates are the major reasons for the same. This
research has tried to mitigate this problem by using techniques from an area called
the Artificial Immune Systems (AIS). AIS is a collusion of immunology, computer
science and engineering and tries to apply a number of techniques followed by the
human immune system in the field of computing (De Castro & Timmis, 2002). An
AIS-based technique called negative selection is used. Existing implementations of
negative selection algorithms have a polynomial worst-case run time for
classification, resulting in huge computational overhead and limited practicality.
This research implements a theoretical concept and achieves linear classification
time. The results from the implementation are compared with that of existing
Intrusion Detection Systems.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
It has always been a challenge to distinguish normal from abnormal activity
in computer processes. Host-based and network-based IDS systems have played a
vital role in securing today’s computing systems and networks. These systems
primarily use rule-based, anomaly-based or state-based intrusion detection
techniques to detect an event (desired and undesired) (Cavusoglu, Mishra, &
Raghunathan, 2005). Each of these detection mechanisms has its own merits and
demerits. The inspiration for this project was drawn from the human immune
system, which has unique ways of detecting foreign agents. While it has some innate
defense mechanisms, some are adaptive. This research has looked into developing an
Artificial Immune System-based intrusion detection system.
The human immune system is highly effective in protecting the human body
from harmful pathogens. Surprisingly, the immune system does not have immunity
for all the pathogens beforehand. Instead, it develops a type of self-tolerance, where
it learns to differentiate the type of cells that belong to the human body (self) and
does not affect such cells (Elberfeld & Textor, 2011). Such a mechanism called
negative selection, is highly applicable to the world of information security. A
sophisticated version of this algorithm was used in this research and its performance
and effectiveness studied.

1.1 Scope
The larger area of intrusion detection tries to differentiate normal and
malicious computer processes. This problem has been investigated for a long time in
computer hosts and networks (Denning, 1987; Staniford-Chen, Tung,
Schnackenberg, et al., 1998). The defense and attack vectors against computing

2
systems have evolved over the years (Peng, Leckie, & Ramamohanarao, 2007). One
of the main concentrations of research in this field has centered around devising
effective detection mechanisms. Though this research concentrates on detection
mechanisms in network-based intrusion detection systems, it was still trying to
improve the larger problem of detecting intrusions in computing systems.
There are several network-based intrusion detection systems that investigate
the network traffic and raise an alarm in the event of a network-based attack. That
said, this research’s scope was limited to anomaly-based network intrusion detection
systems. Signature based or state-based detection mechanisms were not considered.
In particular, the detection mechanisms based on AIS techniques were of particular
interest. The NSL-KDD data set, Revathi and Malathi (2013) that was used to test
the intrusion detection systems in the literature was also used to test the
effectiveness of the developed system.

1.2 Significance
Given the advantages of Anomaly-based detection mechanisms, this research
aimed at making contributions towards producing IDS systems with lesser false
positives, lesser computational overhead and higher detection rates. This would
mean higher adoption of these techniques in the real world and better defense
against zero day attacks. As compared to the literature in the area of Artificial
Immune Systems, that largely concentrates on one of the facets of IDS like pattern
matching or learning, this research is comprehensive and aims at improving all the
aspects of the IDS.
The detection mechanisms are required both in the wireless and wired
networks. The detection techniques developed can considered applicable in both
these types of networks. When the anomaly-based IDS is trained based on self-and
non-self traffic, it will also be useful in offering defenses at the level of wireless
devices like access points.

3
1.3 Research Question
Can lesser false positive and higher detection rates be achieved with lesser
computational overhead using an anomaly-based intrusion detection system that
uses the Artificial Immune System technique of Negative Selection?

1.4 Limitations
The limitations for this study included:
• The research looked only into anomaly-based detection mechanisms for
network-based intrusion detection systems
• While there are a number of approaches towards anomaly-based intrusion
detection, only those based on the area of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS)
were studied
• The effectiveness of the developed built was tested only against the NSL-KDD
dataset.

1.5 Delimitations
The delimitations for this study included:
• The detection mechanism did not use a state-based analysis for detecting
attacks. This meant no defense against multi-stage attacks.
• The host-based and signature based intrusion detection mechanisms were not
taken into account

4
1.6 Summary
This chapter provided the scope, significance, research question, limitations,
delimitations, definitions, and other background information for the research project.
The next chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to this research.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
With more and more devices getting connected over the internet, the number
of threats have proportionally increased. The number of adversaries and the number
of attacks that spawn from these adversaries have increased manifold. The
adversaries are becoming more skilled and successful (N. Hoque, Bhuyan, Baishya,
Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2014). Research has shown that the defenses are not
keeping pace with the attacks (Reddy & Reddy, 2014). The particular interest for
this research in the realm of information security is securing enterprise-wide
networks using Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
In a network, a firewall can be considered analogous to a lock, the intrusion
detection systems can be considered analogous to an alarm (Cavusoglu et al., 2005).
Firewalls are often layer 3 devises that serve as the outermost perimeter of defense
and have a set of packet filter rules that constrain traffic entering a network. A
problem with firewalls is that they do not satisfy all the security needs of a network,
one of the reasons being that they do not monitor the application layer data (Kaur,
Malhotra, & Singh, 2014). This leads to a need for a robust, efficient and resilient
security device. IDS are network devises that satisfy this very need by performing
various forms of packet inspection at different layers and detect the presence of an
attack.

2.1 Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), in general, can be categorized based on
two criteria - the place of deployment of the IDS and the technique that it used for
detection.
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2.1.1 Classification based on the place of deployment
IDS can be deployed at different places relative to the client to achieve
different results. Even though the same detection techniques may be used,
deploying the IDS in different places would mean different things from the
viewpoint of security or effectiveness. The two types are:
• Host-based IDS
• Network-based IDS

2.1.1.1. Host-based IDS
In the initial stages, IDS systems were deployed at the host-level. An
anti-virus program running on a local machine can be considered an example of a
host-level IDS. These types of host-level IDS systems are highly useful when an
adversary tries to intrude and steal sensitive and confidential information stored on
a particular host. These systems do not offer any form of defense for attacks against
the other hosts in the same network. As such, some of the widespread applications
of such IDS systems are in mainframe computers, critical servers and common
desktops.
One of the shortcomings of host-based IDS is that the IDS is a security
bottleneck for the host. If the adversary is able to compromise the IDS, then he or
she can take complete control of the host. It is the last line of defense against
attacks (Berthier, Sanders, & Khurana, 2010). There is also the possibility of an
adversary installing a backdoor or a Trojan in the host after compromising the IDS.
Recent research has advised the separation of an IDS from the host (Crosbie,
Shepley, Kuperman, & Frayman, 2006). This is particularly feasible today with
hardware accessories becoming more affordable.
De Boer and Pels (2005); Depren, Topallar, Anarim, and Ciliz (2005);
Miettinen, Halonen, and Hatonen (2006); Vokorokos and Baláž (2010); Ying, Yan,
and Yang-jia (2010) are some examples of the approaches to host-based IDS.
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2.1.1.2. Network-based IDS
Network-based IDS are deployed at the network level and they work by
studying the network traffic at different levels of abstraction. The sole aim of such
systems is to study network traffic and to detect if there was an attack. If there was
an attack, they either raise an alarm, create a log or respond to the attack,
depending on the way in which the systems were configured. The systems are
considered to be the most successful and most widely used in the industry (Shin,
Kwon, Jo, Park, & Rhy, 2010). Such systems are robust and one has the option of
implementing the concept of defense-in-depth in a network where different layers of
defenses are provided. The systems in the innermost layers have the maximum level
of security.
These systems inspect network traffic in detail to detect if there was an
attack, before permitting the traffic past it. Thus, it is essential that such systems
operate with minimum latency to ensure seamless network traffic speed. This is
becoming particularly challenging with the rapid increase in the volume of network
traffic. Network-based IDS often examine application-layer traffic. In cases of
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and TLS/SSL protocol traffic, the application
layer traffic is encrypted and the IDS, by default, cannot inspect such traffic.

2.1.2 Classification based on the technique for detection
Because the success of IDS depends on successful detection of attacks, such
systems should have an effective detection mechanism that has the least overhead
and highest detection rates. Such detection mechanisms are common to the
host-based IDS and network-based IDS. The detection techniques in general can be
classified in two categories, namely:
• Misuse Detection
• Anomaly-based Detection
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2.1.2.1. Misuse detection
Misuse detection works on the principle that if an attack has been identified,
the future occurrence of the same attack will have similar properties. Therefore,
once an attack is discovered, the signature of such an attack is stored in the IDS in
a blacklist. The blacklist is used to check against the normal traffic and to detect if
there was an attack. Newly discovered attacks are continuously being added to the
blacklist. Effective implementations of such techniques often have very high
detection rates of over 90% (Axelsson, 2000). Other advantages include ease of
configuration and lesser latency. It is very easy for a network administrator to
configure such an IDS, as many of the systems come pre-loaded with a blacklist of
standard attacks. Widely used systems in the industry such as Snort (Alder et al.,
2007), Sourcefire and Cisco CCSP (Carter, 2004) mainly use signature-based
detection.
Misuse detection techniques have some significant shortcomings. This
detection technique significantly depends on the efficiency of the blacklist. It is
essential to update the blacklist with the latest attack signatures. This particularly
becomes a challenge with thousands of new attacks being devised every day (Fossi
et al., 2011). More signatures in the blacklist would mean that the traffic has to be
checked against more and more patterns and there is also more memory
consumption for storage of new signatures (Liao, Lin, Lin, & Tung, 2013)
The prevalence of zero-day attacks creates more problems for such systems.
Zero-day attacks exploit the vulnerabilities that have not been patched by the
software and equipment vendors. Because the signature of such attacks have no
chance of being known, they can easily pass undetected by this type of IDS. Also
with attacks such as polymorphic malware that change their own source code or
properties frequently, it is hard to devise a correct signature for detection of such
threats. Research has criticized the technique for being too much attack-centric and
for not taking into consideration as to what is normal traffic. (Liao et al., 2013).
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2.1.2.2. Anomaly-based detection
Anomaly-based detection learns from the environment in which it is installed
(usually the network) as to what is normal traffic (Di Pietro & Mancini, 2008). The
normal traffic is either represented by statistical models that depict the normal
traffic levels or with the help of user profiles where a profile is created for every user
in the network. Such profiles are built based on normal user activity on the network
such as file access, login attempts, administrative activities, etc. The longer the
system is in the network, the more effective it will become. This is because over
time, the system’s understanding of the environment will improve. Such
anomaly-based systems are of particular interest to this research.
This understanding of the normal behavior can then be leveraged to make
intrusion detection better (Garcia-Teodoro, Diaz-Verdejo, Maciá-Fernández, &
Vázquez, 2009). Any deviation of traffic or user behavior from the normal traffic is
considered an anomaly. Many systems use an anomaly score that will represent the
level of anomaly in the network traffic. There are threshold levels configured in the
IDS that will dictate how much deviation from the normal is allowed. If the
anomaly-score goes beyond the predefined threshold levels, then it means an
intrusion has occurred (Peddabachigari, Abraham, Grosan, & Thomas, 2007). If the
detected intrusion is found to be a false positive, then the security officer flags the
intrusion as a false positive. Some IDS have mechanisms of incorporating the false
positives in normal traffic’s profile. By this, the next instance of such traffic will not
be considered an anomaly.
One of the main problems that such systems face is the high rate of false
positives. This occurs with the IDS considering normal traffic anomalous. The
security officer or the network administrator who manages the network will
eventually become insensitive to such false alarms and end up ignoring most of them
(Lundin & Jonsson, 2000). This tendency would lead the security officer to miss
important attacks and intrusions. Even though the false negative rate is actually
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low, the tendency of the security officer to neglect detected anomalies eventually
leads to a low detection rate.
Researchers like J. Zhang and Zulkernine (2006) claim that such
anomaly-based IDS have high false positive rates because of their inability to
accurately model normal traffic and activities. In other words, such systems cannot
accurately differentiate self from non-self-traffic - self being the traffic that is normal
and non-self being the traffic that is anomalous. There is a need for a clear
differentiation of self and non-self along with a need for effective representation of
self (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). This research has tried to address this issue.
There is also an inherent assumption associated with several anomaly-based
IDS. The assumption is that there is a noticeable dissimilarity between self and
non-self-traffic (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). While this is true with many
instances, these days, the attacks are increasingly designed to look like normal
traffic. This breaks the inherent assumption about non-self-traffic. As a result, it is
required to take this assumption out of the equation.

2.2 Parameters of IDS effectiveness
The effectiveness of any IDS system is based on the following parameters.
These parameters were used for comparing the end product of this research with the
existing systems in literature:
• False Positives: false positives occur when the normal traffic is considered an
attack by the IDS.
• False Negatives: false negatives occur when an attack passes through the IDS
undetected.
• True Positives: This depicts the ideal event that is expected of an IDS. True
positive occurs when an actual attack occurs and an alarm is raised.
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Depending on the configuration, the IDS will the respond to the attack or
create a log depicting the attack and the associated details.
• True Negatives: True negatives are also expected out of an IDS. The true
negative is when there is no attack at all and the IDS raises no alarm.
• Efficiency: It is essential for the IDS to monitor traffic without incurring
considerable overhead. Higher computational and spatial overhead may limit
the practicality of an IDS in real world networks.
An ideal IDS will thus have 0% false positives and false negatives with 100% true
positives and true negatives.

2.3 Artificial Immune Systems
The fundamental problem an IDS is trying to solve is to differentiate normal
from abnormal traffic. Nature provides us with an example of such a system - the
Human Immune System (HIS). The HIS performs the same task of differentiating
self (human) and non-self-cells (bacteria, virus or any other form of infection) in a
highly distributed, self-organizing and efficient manner. Despite the amount of
memory and pattern recognition features it incorporates, it has the minimum
overhead associated. In the event of detecting a non-self-presence, it secretes
antibodies that are meant to destroy those non-self-cells. The area of Artificial
Immune Systems (AIS) tries to model a detection mechanism based on such features
of the HIS. Developed in 1994 by Forrest, Perelson, Allen, and Cherukuri (1994), it
bridges the areas of computing, immunology and statistical modeling.
AIS finds its application in a number of areas like data mining, intrusion
detection and mathematical modeling. The literature in the area of AIS is
categorized into three main categories namely Applied AIS, theoretical AIS and
Immune modeling (Dasgupta, Yu, & Nino, 2011). Immune modeling is the area that
develops various models that simulate the working of a HIS. The various techniques

12
described in the following sections are a product of research in this area. Theoretical
AIS, on the other hand, involves analyzing the algorithms for performance,
complexity and analyzes ways of making such algorithms better.
The area of Applied AIS involves actually applying the algorithms and
models for other applications. The techniques like negative selection and danger
theory are some of the techniques that were devised based on the HIS in the area of
applied AIS (Dasgupta et al., 2011). The technique of negative selection is of
interest to this research as they have been shown to be highly effective and
applicable to the area of the intrusion detection. Numerous instances in the
literature stand as example of this: Gao, Ovaska, and Wang (2006); Garrett (2005);
Jinquan et al. (2009); Kim and Bentley (2001).

2.4 Negative Selection
Given that the research implements a negative selection algorithm, the
literature in negative selection is studied in detail.

2.4.1 Literature and evolution of Negative Selection approaches
Negative selection is essentially derived from the HIS (Klein, Kyewski, Allen,
& Hogquist, 2014). The T cells in the human body are formed in the bone marrow
and then transferred to the thymus, where they develop and nurture. T cells work
by generally binding to an antigen and destroying it. These cells are one of the most
efficient forms of defenses against various antigens. Negative selection is a technique
that the HIS employs during the developmental stages of the T cells in the thymus.
It is essentially a technique that is used for killing the T cells that might end up
binding with the self-cells themselves. The same technique is carried on to AIS.
The generators in the AIS are analogous to the T cells in the HIS. The
generators are first generated by the AIS library based on certain heuristics. Such
detectors in the initial phase are called immature detectors. Furthermore, feedback
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from proceeding stages are also used to generate better detectors in the subsequent
phases. Negative selection is used to filter out the detectors that might bind (detect
in the context of IDS) to the self-traffic (Aickelin, Dasgupta, & Gu, 2014). The
immature detectors are first made to interact with the self-traffic. Those set of
detectors that match with at least m-immature number of self-traffic within the
time t-immature are negative selected or deleted. Those detectors that were not
destroyed in this procedure will be called mature detectors and this process is called
negative selection.
These mature detectors are then exposed to the non-self- cells for a time
t-mature. During this time, if the mature detectors do not bind to (detect in the
context of IDS) m-mature number of non-self-cells, then they will be deleted too.
Those mature detectors that survived the above process will henceforth be called
memory detectors. This process of generating mature detectors is called positive
selection. Some systems also use the process of co-stimulation in order for the
mature detectors to be promoted (Wong et al., 2012). Co-stimulation is the process
in which a security officer has to manually confirm that the non-self-traffic detected
by the mature detector was actually an attack.
The memory detectors are then used for detection of anomalies in the
system. It is to be noted that the memory detectors have a higher lifetime and have
a higher impact on the anomaly score, than the other classes of detectors. Another
thing to be noted is that whenever an active detector (includes mature and memory
detectors) is deleted from the system, it is replaced with a new appropriate detector.
A feedback is sent from back to the library, to ensure the same types of detectors
are not generated again. Thus, at a given point in time, the number of active
detectors will always be constant Aickelin et al. (2014).
From the perspective of computer networks, the detectors are often large,
constant length binary strings that are used to bind to a traffic if there is a
similarity. Hamming distance or some other means can be used for computing the
similarity. Such strings usually represent some of the network parameters like IP
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address, TCP port number of source and destination, etc. The network parameters
will be considered and some form of heuristics will be applied for the initial
generation of immature detectors.
Research is being done on effective ways of representing such binary strings.
Luo, Wang, Tan, and Wang (2006) has shown that an r [] - type-detector having an
array with multiple partial matching lengths gives us better results for pattern
matching. It is desirable to have an AIS that has a pattern matching algorithm that
matches multiple patterns with the least latency. Luo, Wang, and Wang (2007)
introduces one such method that has the capability to detect a multitude of
patterns by the construction of a self-graph. It works by the conversion of the set of
self-traffic into a graph called self-graph and by using it for pattern matching and
searching.
The processes explained above explain negative selection processes on a very
high level and will vary from implementation to implementation. A high level view
of this system would indicate the primary difference between anomaly-based and
misuse-based detection. As it is pointed out in Di Pietro and Mancini (2008), the
detectors in anomaly-based detection is modeled after the self-traffic and making no
assumptions about the non-self-traffic. The misuse detection on the other hand is
centered on attacks and therefore becomes outdated with the development of new
attacks. This fundamental principle in the anomaly-based systems is what helps
better detection of zero-day and newer, emerging forms of attacks.
There has been a steady improvement of the negative selection techniques in
the literature. Gao et al. (2006) could be considered as one of the fore-runners that
proposed a full scale working model for intrusion detection using negative selection.
This employs an optimized genetic algorithm for negative selection. Clonal
Optimization that was suggested as a part of the research proposes a modification
to the learning phase that will help, particularly with intrusion detection. Shapiro,
Lamont, and Peterson (2005) suggested optimizations to the identification phase by
the use of hyper-ellipsoids in place of hyper-spheres for detection. Hyper-ellipsoids
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based detection can offer the same performance with less latency. This is because
hyper-ellipsoids can stretch more than sphere and hence can cover a larger surface
area.
Luo, Wang, and Wang (2005) suggests an evolutionary approach for negative
selection. Here the detectors will go through a number of generations of genetic
mutation, positive and negative selections before they can become a mature or a
memory detector. The number of generations will define the effectiveness of the
system. The more the number of constructive generations, the greater will be its
efficiency. Ma, Tran, and Sharma (2008) suggests a simple feedback mechanism
based on Luo et al. (2005). The researchers suggest incorporating a simple feedback
mechanism that would send a feedback whenever a detector was deleted. The
feedback will indicate properties about the detector that was destroyed and decrease
the chances of the library producing similar detectors in the future.

2.4.2 Negative selection based algorithms
For one to use the negative selection technique in the real world, it is
essential to implement the techniques in the form of concrete algorithms. Such
algorithms should also be efficient and effective. On a high level, since negative
selection is a classification problem (involving classification into self and non-self), a
number of learning and classification procedures have been used in the literature
(Textor, 2013).
Pattern matching forms an integral role in negative selection. Most
implementations involve r-contiguous or r-chunk pattern matching schemes (Stibor,
2009). According to the r-contiguous matching rule, a message string matches a
detector string if they both have the same length and they have at least ’r’
matching characters contiguously (Textor, 2012). This approach mimics the
approach followed by the human immune system when the T cells bind to antigens.
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r-chunk matching uses detectors that match more than one string at once. In
other words, it generalizes several strings using one string (Elberfeld & Textor,
2009). This makes it more efficient than r-contiguous matching when it comes to
performance. Such detection is more suitable for input data that does not have
semantic correlation among the adjacent characters (like network packet data)
(Balthrop, Esponda, Forrest, Glickman, et al., 2002). Many implementations of
these algorithms are considered less applicable to the real world because they suffer
from high computational overhead (Luther, Bye, Alpcan, Muller, & Albayrak, 2007;
Stibor, Mohr, Timmis, & Eckert, 2005). This research tries to solve the complexity
problem by using the Trie data structure for representing r-chunk detectors identical
to Elberfeld and Textor (2011).

2.5 Summary
The first part of this work discussed the literature in the area of intrusion
detection systems in detail. A thorough analysis of the work in the area of Artificial
Immune Systems (AIS) was discussed in the second part. The literature in negative
selection was specifically discussed. Developed only in 1990s, there is still
considerable amount of work that needs to be done before AIS based products are
widely approved in the industry. The interdisciplinary nature of this area also
makes research more challenging.
The next chapter provides the framework and methodology used in the
research project.
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides the framework and methodology to be used in the
research study.

3.1 Research Goal
To build better defenses against zero-day attacks using an anomaly-based
intrusion detection system based on Artificial Immune Systems with minimum
overhead and maximum effectiveness possible. The false positive and detection rates
are also to be compared with other prominent anomaly-based and signature-based
intrusion detection systems like Alder et al. (2007); Estevez-Tapiador,
Garcia-Teodoro, and Diaz-Verdejo (2003); M. S. Hoque, Mukit, Bikas, Naser, et al.
(2012); Hu, Yu, Qiu, and Chen (2009); Nakkeeran, Albert, and Ezumalai (2010).

3.2 Dataset used
Publicly available datasets were used in the literature for testing Intrusion
Detection Systems. Such datasets served as a benchmark for the various parameters
of an IDS like false positives, false negatives and detection rates. This also served
the purpose of analyzing such parameters in relation to other existing IDS systems.
Though such datasets may not simulate a real life network environment accurately,
these are essential to evaluate the detection methods accurately and consistently
(Gogoi, Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2012). One such dataset used in studying
the IDS that was developed as a part of this research was the NSL-KDD dataset.
NSL-KDD dataset overcomes many of the shortcomings in the KDD-cup
dataset kddcup99 data set (1999). A detailed analysis of this dataset is provided in
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(Revathi & Malathi, 2013). This dataset is more suitable for testing anomaly-based
IDS systems while avoiding huge overhead for generation and storage of information
about redundant traffic in the training dataset. Also, the absence of redundant
traffic in the training dataset leads to the results being not biased on the frequently
occurring records (Stolfo, Fan, Lee, Prodromidis, & Chan, 2000).
The training dataset contains around 21 different types of attacks, falling
under 4 classes of attacks: remote-to-local, user-to-root, denial of service and
probing (Revathi & Malathi, 2013). These attacks, along with 16 additional types of
attacks are interspersed within normal traffic in the test dataset. A sample record
from the training data set is shown below (Habibi, 2015):
0,tcp,http,SF,247,799,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,4,4,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,
0.00,0.00,192,255,1.00,0.00,0.01,0.02,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal
The above record is an IP-packet encoded as a string and is labeled as normal
traffic. Similarly, there are records that are labeled as ‘anomaly’ in the training set.
The test set also comprises of such labeled records. The labels in the test set was
removed using a Python script before used for testing with the developed IDS.
KDD-cup dataset is a widely known dataset used for testing and evaluation
of IDS and was first introduced by Stolfo et al. (2000). The training dataset
contains over 4.9 million connection vectors and the traffic is labeled. There are
some known issues with this dataset like presence of redundant and duplicate traffic
in the training and test datasets (Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, & Ghorbani, 2009). The
existence of redundant records tends to incur a huge storage overhead and fails to
actually test the effectiveness of detection mechanism. The NSL-KDD dataset
overcomes these shortcomings and thus was used instead.
DARPA 2000 dataset, Lippmann, Haines, Fried, Korba, and Das (2000)
contains more complex attacks that involve multi-stage attacks. These types of
attacks require context-based analysis for detection, as the attacks are spread out
across different network traffic packets. Since state-based detection is out of scope
for this research, this dataset was not used.
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3.2.1 Necessity for using standard datasets
In general, we are faced with a number of challenges when benchmarking and
testing an IDS (Ranum, 2001). While testing an IDS system with traffic generated
in the lab environment is a possibility, it is not advisable. One of the reasons being
that such data may not always simulate real world network and threat
environments. Especially with newer forms of threats being introduced constantly,
this becomes more challenging. It is also hard to obtain data from the real world
network environments, because most organizations are protected by privacy
regulations (Lazarevic, Ertöz, Kumar, Ozgur, & Srivastava, 2003).
Most importantly, even if we were to obtain such real world data, the
negative selection algorithm needs data labeled as ‘normal’ or ‘anomalous’ for the
training phase. Such labeling is extremely hard to perform on real world data
(Catania & Garino, 2012). The same case applies for testing. For us to calculate
false positives and false negatives, we need labeled test traffic (Thaseen & Kumar,
2013).
For these reasons, using a dataset which is labeled, publicly available, and
empirically proven is necessary. Such standard datasets exist and help in effective
testing and validation of an IDS. Since these datasets are publicly available, and
results of various IDS systems against such datasets are available, this enables
comparison of the results of any given IDS.

3.3 Analytical Procedures
The developed IDS is modular in structure. Various functionalities like
network capture, decoding and detection are separated into different, independent
modules. This makes the IDS extensible where additional modules can be added to
the system with minor changes to the existing modules. Such modular architecture
has proven successful for a number of effective IDS systems in the literature. Some
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of such examples are Alder et al. (2007); Garfinkel, Rosenblum, et al. (2003);
Paxson, Campbell, Lee, et al. (2006); Y. Zhang and Lee (2000)
In order to compare effectiveness and detection rates, the developed IDS was
tested against a standard dataset in the literature. The results of various
parameters of the IDS like false positives, false negatives, and detection rates were
then compared against a number of standard IDS systems in the literature. Given
the importance of efficiency for any IDS system, parameters like CPU utilization
and memory utilization were also analyzed
This section is organized in the following way: The first subsection discusses
the overall working of the developed IDS by explaining the various modules of the
system. The following subsection explains the negative selection module along with
the relevant algorithms in detail. This is followed by discussion of the testing
mechanisms that was used for testing the developed IDS. Results of the testing is
discussed in Chapter 4.

3.3.1 Overall architecture of the developed IDS
A Java application was developed as a part of this research. The various
modules of this application are
1. Input module
2. Network Decoder module
3. Negative Selection module
4. Classification module
The network traffic passes from the input to the classification module as
shown in the Figure 3.1. The input module captures the traffic from any given
network interface. The jNetPcap library, Franusic (2014) is used for this purpose.
PCAP files are generated and stored in the local directory. Optionally, if the user
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does not want the traffic to be captured from the network interface, the user could
directly feed in the PCAP files. Usually two type of files are to be fed into the input
module namely the self file and the test file. The self file is the training file that will
be used by the algorithm for training and generation of detectors. The test file is
the packet capture of the normal traffic that is to be monitored. Traffic in this file
will be classified as normal or anomalous in the end.

Figure 3.1.: Flow of data across different modules

The network decoder module then converts the data in PCAP files into
information usable by the next module. Packet header fields in each of the packets
are extracted. A constant length binary string is generated from the value of
extracted fields. The strings generated from both the self and test files are
converted to ASCII and stored in separate files for use by the algorithm.
The negative selection module uses the self and test strings generated from
the previous module to generate detectors which will then be used in classification.
The working of negative selection module is explained in detail in the following
section. The negative selection module generates a set of detectors based on the self
strings. The detector set is represented using prefix directed acyclic graphs.
These detectors are then used in classification module. The classification
module is the final module that decides whether the traffic is self or non-self. The
detectors are generated in such a way that it depicts traffic that is normal. So if the
classification module finds a string in the test file that does not match with any of
the detectors, it means that the string points to a traffic that is an anomaly.
An anomaly score is generated depending on the level up to which the self
and detector strings match, to facilitate in classification. If the anomaly score
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crosses a predefined and configurable anomaly threshold, then the case could be
classified an anomaly. The anomaly threshold value can be set low if the network
environment operates under high risk levels. This low threshold value will ensure
that even the slightest anomaly is flagged. Under normal network environments, it
is not advised to keep the anomaly threshold low, as it might need to higher false
positives and redundant alarms.

3.3.2 Working of the negative selection module

3.3.2.1. Introduction to negative selection
In the simplest form, a negative selection algorithm takes a self set (also called
the training set) as an input. A detector set is then generated as a result of training
from the self set. This detector set is generated in such a way that is representative
of either the self or non-self traffic (Elberfeld & Textor, 2011). If representative of
non-self traffic, it does not match with any of the elements in the self set. This
detector set can then be used for classifying any given data as self or non-self. Since
the process of classification happens more frequently, it is essential for us to achieve
it with the least computational overhead (Elberfeld & Textor, 2011).
During the process of generation of the detectors, constant length binary
strings from the self set will be used for training. In the context of computer
networks, one string will be generated from every network packet, from fields like
source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port numbers, etc. The
detector set generated from the self traffic is usually represented using data
structures like tree or trie for easier string lookups. It is to be noted that the
representation of the detector set with an appropriate data structure has a large
influence on the processing overhead associated with the classification process.
Similar to the data structure representing the detectors, the means of looking
up a string in the detector set has to be very efficient and is explained in detail in
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the following section. Such matching techniques, called affinity functions have been
a subject of research for a long time (Timmis, Hone, Stibor, & Clark, 2008).
Usually, the output of such affinity functions is used to calculate an anomaly score,
depending on the extent of match between the detectors and any given string. If the
anomaly crosses a given threshold, an alert is generated.

3.3.2.2. Negative selection algorithm
The most generic form of the negative selection can be seen in Algorithm 1
(Figure 3.2). Similar explanation can be found in (Elberfeld & Textor, 2009).
Throughout this section, the following notations will be used: Σl is the universal set
of strings, all having a length l. Two partitions of this set, namely S (self) and N
(non-self) are assumed to be known. The inputs that are fed into the algorithm are
a sample S ⊆ S of self-strings and M ⊆ Σl , called monitor set which has all strings
that are to be classified. These notations are similar to what is found in Elberfeld
and Textor (2011)
S will be used by the algorithm for training and generation of a set of
detectors D. An ideal set of D is supposed to have elements that either match with
none of the elements in S or it matches with all of the elements in S. The detectors
D will then be used for classifying M as self or non-self. An affinity function is used
when comparing detector string to a monitor string. Different implementations of
such affinity functions exist. Similarly, the generation and representation of the
detectors would vary depending on the implementation.

3.3.2.3. r-chunk matching algorithm
A function that would compute the affinity of a detector to any given string
is essential in negative selection. Hamming shape-space distance, r-contiguous
matching and r-chunk matching are some of the ways of computing this affinity.
The r-contiguous and r-chunk matching scheme are the most widely followed
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Figure 3.2.: Algorithm 1: Basic negative selection algorithm

approaches associated with negative selection in the literature (Liśkiewicz & Textor,
2010; Stibor, 2009).
r-contiguous matching technique as proposed in Percus, Percus, and Perelson
(1993) is a direct adaptation of the technique followed by the T-cells. According
this scheme, the detector string matches with any given string, if and only if the
detector matches with the given string in at least r continuous positions. The
matching characters has to occur at the same indices at the detector and training
strings. A generic definition of r-contiguous detectors can be found in Elberfeld and
Textor (2009):
Definition 1 (r-contiguous detectors): “An r-contiguous detector is a string
d∈ ΣL . It matches another string s∈ ΣL if there is an i∈{1, . . . , L - r + 1} with
d[i, . . . , i + r - 1] = s[i, . . . , i + r - 1]”
In the case of analyzing network packets, where consecutive characters in a
string do not have essentially a semantic correlation between them, r-chunk
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matching is a better approach (Balthrop et al., 2002). An r-chunk matching scheme
was used when comparing detectors with the test traffic as a part of the
methodology. A generic definition of r-chunk detectors can be found in Elberfeld
and Textor (2009):
Definition 2 (r-chunk detectors): “An r-chunk detector (d,i) is a tuple of a
string d∈ Σr and an integer i∈{1,...,L-r+1}. It matches another string s∈ Σl if
s[i,...i+r-1] = d”
A number of implementations of r-chunk detector scheme has turned out to
have a worst-case space complexity that is exponential of the input self-set size
(Elberfeld & Textor, 2009). For example, Stibor, Bayarou, and Eckert (2004),
Elberfeld and Textor (2009), and D’haeseleer, Forrest, and Helman (1996) all have
exponential running times. This makes the implementation very less practical. As
noted earlier, one cannot afford to have high performance and space overheads in
IDS systems. The space complexity is mainly because all the implementations tend
to generate an exhaustive list of detectors. This becomes more computation
intensive when the self-set is too large. It was argued in Timmis et al. (2008) that
this problem is at best an NP-hard one.
It was not until Elberfeld and Textor (2009) that it was proved that this
problem could be solved in linear time. Elberfeld and Textor (2009) used patterns
to depict a set of strings. That way, the self set and the detector set can be
generated and depicted with lesser time and space overhead. Further optimizations
were also proposed in Liśkiewicz and Textor (2010).
Since the r-chunk detectors are represented as strings along with indices,
prefix tree is a data structure that is more suited to represent them. This was first
introduced in Elberfeld and Textor (2011) and has proven to achieve linear running
times for classification. In this research too, the r-chunk detectors are represented as
prefix trees and prefix directed acyclic graphs, similar to Elberfeld and Textor
(2011). Both of these concepts are explained in the following section.
A tree can be called a prefix tree T if it satisfies the following conditions:
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1. It has exactly one root node (a node with no inbound edges) and can have one
or more leaf nodes (nodes with no outbound edges)
2. All the edges are labeled with characters of the alphabet Σ
3. Each node cannot have more than one edge that is labeled with the same
element a∈ Σ
4. For a string s, one could say s∈T if there exists a path in T from the root to
the leaf node with labels the same as the characters of s.
5. Language L(t) is a set consisting of strings with one or more characters
appended to the end of elements of the set T. In other words, each of the
strings in L(T) has a prefix string s’∈T (Elberfeld & Textor, 2011). A prefix
string s’ of a string s is made of the first n-r characters of s, where r<n, n
being the length of the string.
Figure 3.2 is an example of a prefix tree:

Figure 3.3.: An example prefix-tree

For the above example, s=‘bb’∈T because there is a path from the root node
to the leaf with these characters as labels. Similarly, s=‘ab’∈T and s=‘aa’∈T
/
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A prefix directed acylic graph (prefix DAG), denoted as D is similar to a
prefix tree except that it is a acyclic graph as opposed to a tree. The following are
the conditions are to be satisfied for it to be called a prefix DAG:
1. The prefix DAG can have more than one root and leaf nodes
2. All the edges are labeled with characters of the alphabet Σ
3. Each node cannot have more than one edge that is labeled with the same
element a ∈ Σ
4. A string s is said to belong to D, if and only if there is a path from a root to a
leaf node labeled the same edges as the string. Note that as opposed to the
prefix tree, the prefix DAG can have more than one root and leaf nodes.
5. Language L(d,n) is a set consisting of strings with one more characters
appended to the end of elements of the set D for a given root node n. In other
words, each of the strings in L(T) has a prefix string s’∈T (Elberfeld &
Textor, 2011). A prefix string s’ of a string s of length n is made of the first
n-r characters of s, where r<n.
Figure 3.3 is an example prefix DAG. For this example, s=‘acbe’, s=‘df’ and
s=‘abe’ are some example strings that belong D, because there is a path from a root
to a leaf node with those labels on it.
Generation of r-chunk detectors: The following section will discuss the
algorithm that would generate the r-chunk detectors. The ultimate aim is for us to
achieve O(l) for classification. This is equivalent to the best know performance for
negative selection achieved in Elberfeld and Textor (2011). Prefix DAG with failure
links will be used representing the detectors. The characteristics and criteria for a
prefix DAG is already discussed in the previous section. For a set of monitor strings,
each of length l, the algorithm ultimately produces a prefix tree Ti for every index
i∈{1,...,l-r+1} of m. For the self set S, the set of trees Ti , will be such that it is a
representative of self set.
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Figure 3.4.: An example prefix-DAG

Algorithm 2 (Figure 3.5) explains r-chunk detector generation algorithm in
detail. First the algorithm begins by creating empty prefix trees, one for each of
i∈{1,...,l-r+1}. Once created, the sub-strings (from index position i to the index
position i+r-1 ) of strings in the self set is continuously added onto the
corresponding prefix trees. This is achieved by the lines 8 to 10 in the algorithm.
The lines 11 to 13 perform the function of adding new leaf nodes to every non-leaf
node with edges labeled with all characters a∈ Σ. As per the condition 3 of the
prefix trees, no two outbound edges from a node should have the same the labels on
them. This is ensured by line 12 of the algorithm. Subsequently, in lines 13 to 15,
all the nodes that do not point to the newly generated nodes will be deleted.
The set of all prefix trees generated at the end of algorithm 2 are going to
have a Language L(T) that has strings that matches with none of the string in
non-self set. For classification of any monitor sting, it could be compared with L(T),
which will serve as the detector set. If there is match found for the monitor string
with a string in L(T), then it can be classified as self (detector set, L(T) being
representative of the self set). Though training takes O(| S | lr | Σ |), the
classification can be done in just O(lr) (Elberfeld & Textor, 2011)
But O(lr) has to be further improved for us to match ideal IDS performance.
For achieving this, failure links are added to the prefix trees, effectively making
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Figure 3.5.: Algorithm 2: Construction of prefix-tree

them graphs (called prefix DAG). This technique was originally proposed in Knuth,
Morris, and Pratt (1977) for the purpose of pattern matching in strings. This
technique has evolved and has been applied in a number of researches over the years
including Crochemore, Hancart, and Lecroq (2007); Dandass, Burgess, Lawrence,
and Bridges (2008); Lin, Lin, Lai, and Lee (2008); Oh, Oh, and Ro (2013); Turing
(2006).
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The purpose of failure links is to avoid redundant searching of a pattern in a
set of trees. When a pattern is not found in a particular tree, it is common to search
for the same pattern in the next tree, starting from root node all over again. To
avoid this redundant and unnecessary search, failure links are added between the
trees, depicting where the search should start in the subsequent tree. This avoids
searching from the root node all over again. This model is also proposed as a
proof-of-concept in Elberfeld and Textor (2011), which has been implemented here
and tested against the real-world network traffic. The algorithm followed in this
research is explained in Algorithm 3 (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6.: Algorithm 3: Construction of prefix-DAG

As shown in Algorithm 3 (Elberfeld & Textor, 2009), the failure links are
generated for the set of prefix trees. For every tree, choose a pair of ‘n’ and ‘a’,
where ‘n’ is the node in the tree and ‘a’ is the character that is not labeled on any of
the outgoing nodes of ‘n’ (Elberfeld & Textor, 2009). If s is the string that is formed
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by the labels of edges from the root of the tree to the node ‘n’, for a string s’ = sa.
Say, there is a path from n to n’ that would point to such a string, n’ being the node
in the next tree, form an edge connecting n and n’. This is an example of a failure
link. Form failure links for each of the nodes in subsequent trees, when the above
conditions are satisfied. These failure links will help in expediting the search process
(Elberfeld & Textor, 2009).

3.3.2.4. n and r values
n and r values are the most important parameters in r-chunk matching
algorithm. n value is the length of the string in training dataset that will be used
for generation the detectors. For a given training dataset, larger n value does not
essentially mean a better detection rate. Because in some datasets, larger n value
would mean larger noise is included in training. An example of noise in the context
a network packet can be values of optional headers which do not essentially help in
the detection of attacks. Also, larger n value would mean higher processing and
storage overhead associated with training process, because larger strings are
processed. Similarly, if n value is set too small, it would lead to generation of
detectors which are not essentially representative of the training dataset.
r value controls the length of the detectors that will be generated. In our
algorithm, since detectors are represented as DAGs, larger r value would mean
larger DAGs. In theory, ideal r value is one that is closest to n (Esponda, Forrest, &
Helman, 2004). But since the generation of detectors is an exponential algorithm,
higher r value would have a disastrous effect on the performance (Esponda et al.,
2004; Stibor et al., 2005). For this reason, r value was varied from 40% of n up to
80% of n and the corresponding results analyzed.
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3.3.3 Testing the Intrusion Detection System

3.3.3.1. Detection and false alarm rates
Parameters like true and false positives rates, true and false negatives rates
are the most important parameters of any IDS. As pointed out in the previous
sections, these parameters are a measure of the effectiveness of the detection
mechanism of an IDS. For the given dataset, the results of these parameters were
analyzed for different thresholds and r-values.
It is to be noted that higher false negative rate can be tolerated as compared
to higher false positive rate (Hofmeyr, Forrest, & Somayaji, 1998). This is because,
false negatives can be solved by adding additional detection mechanisms and
additional layers of security. But false positives cannot be solved in a similar
manner. On the other hand, layering will only compound the false positives
problem. In statistical theory, false negatives are type I errors and false positives are
type II errors (Storey, 2003).
The formulae used for the calculation of these rates is the same as used in
Portnoy, Eskin, and Stolfo (2001). Detection rate is calculated from the number of
true positives divided by the total number of non-self instances in the test dataset
(Portnoy et al., 2001). False positive rate is calculated from the number of false
positives divided by the number of normal (self) instances in the test dataset
(Portnoy et al., 2001). False negative rate is defined as the number of false negative
instances divided by the total number of anomalous (non-self) instances in the test
dataset (Portnoy et al., 2001).

3.3.3.2. ROC curve analysis
Introduced in Axelsson (1999), Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)
curves are important benchmarks of the effectiveness of IDS systems. An ROC
curve is a plot of the false positive rate against the detection rate. A convex ROC
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curve is a sign of effective detection mechanism. Concave curve implies so-called
‘holes’ in the IDS that might lead to high false negative rates. Rapid drops in the
curve is also a sign of weakness in the IDS.
It is to be noted that at worst operating conditions, the IDS can claim none
of its inputs to be an attack. In such case, the detection rate and also the false
positive rate will be 0. On other hand, if the IDS claims each and every input to be
an attack, the detection rate and false positive rate will be 1 (100%). Hence
theoretically, the points (0,0) and (1,1) will be a part of any ROC plot (Axelsson,
1999; Chen, Hsu, & Shen, 2005).

3.3.4 Testing Environment
The developed Java application was packaged as a JAR file and run on a
Virtual Machine running on a ESXi server. The VM used was Kali Linux
environment with a Java version of 1.8.0. Since the program would have high
memory requirements, the VM was installed with a RAM capacity of 40GB and
hard disk capacity of 120GB. The number of logical processors allocated were 12.
The VM was isolated from the outside network with appropriate packet filtering
rules on a Packet Fence firewall. Since the implementation was done in Java, the
application can be tested on other platforms as well.

3.4 Summary
This chapter provided the framework and methodology used in the research
study.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The NSL-KDD dataset is an improvement over the original KDD cup dataset
(Revathi & Malathi, 2013). More details about this dataset were discussed in the
previous chapter. The developed IDS was tested against the NSL-KDD dataset and
parameter values like false positives, false negatives and detection rates were
calculated. ROC curves were also plotted for the obtained results. Testing was
repeated with different values of n, r, and anomaly threshold values and the
corresponding rates were calculated.

4.1 Processing data
Some pre-processing had to be done on the dataset before testing it on the
IDS. Since the negative selection module accepts only self traffic as an input for
training, a Python script was written to retrieve only the normal traffic from the
labeled training data. Also, since the self data has to have strings that are of the
same length, the records were padded with the character ‘0’ so that all the records
were the length of the largest string in the file. Similarly, a different Python script
was used for calculating false positive, false negative, and detection rates from the
logs of the developed IDS. This was because, the developed IDS reads the test
traffic and only classifies each record as ‘normal’ or ‘anomaly’, based on several
factors discussed earlier. This result has to be compared with the labeled test data
to calculate the detection rates.
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4.2 Detection and false alarm rates
False positive and detection rates were calculated by running the test data in
the NSL-KDD dataset. These rates were obtained for different n, r and threshold
values. Since the length of strings in the test dataset was 152 (including the added
padding), the n values tested were between 70 and 120. Higher n values only
resulted in poorer detection rates and insufficient heap memory. As stated earlier, r
values were tested between 40% and 80% of the given n value. Anomaly threshold
was varied between 10% and 100%. Highest detection rate obtained was 81.56% for
n=100, r=40 and threshold = 20%. But the corresponding false positive rate was
also high at 39.52%.
By varying the above mentioned parameters, the false alarm and detection
rates were calculated. Table 4.1 shows the different average rates for given n values.
It can be seen than an n value of 100 yields the best average detection rate of
64.90%. But this also resulted in a moderate average false positive rate of 31.37%.
As n value was increased above 100, the average detection rate started to decline.
This may be attributed to the increased noise being included for generation of
detectors. Also with higher n values, the system ran out of heap space and crashed
abruptly. This can be attributed to huge storage overhead associated with
generation of large detectors. The percentage of test cases crashed for given n values
can be seen in the Figure 4.1.

4.3 ROC Curves
As mentioned in the previous chapter, ROC curves are plots of detection
rates against false positive rates. Such curves indicate the operating region of an
IDS and also lets the network administrator decide on the operating region that is
suitable for a given network environment. As mentioned earlier, the points (0,0) and
(1,1) occur at the worst operating conditions of any IDS. Figure 4.2 shows the ROC

36

Table 4.1: Comparison of average rates for given n values
Average False

Average

Average False

positive rate (%)

Detection Rate (%)

Negative Rate (%)

70

28.81126149

61.32805454

38.67195

75

31.37546036

59.14728688

40.85271

80

32.26197881

58.73763987

41.26236

85

32.56920446

58.97770202

41.0223

90

32.59815859

59.43509852

40.5649

95

32.25811202

59.92991625

40.07008

100

31.37725954

64.9015537

35.09845

105

28.57572458

64.11440177

35.8856

110

27.85102122

64.35154137

35.64846

115

27.69153854

64.47825927

35.52174

120

27.51650887

64.62266274

35.37734

n-value

Figure 4.1.: Percentage of crashed test cases Vs. n value

curve for the tested dataset with these two points. This curve was plotted using
about 565 tested cases, obtained by varying n, r and threshold values.
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Figure 4.2.: ROC curve including points (0,0) and (1,1)

Figure 4.3 shows the actual ROC curve without the points (0,0) and (1,1).
This curve is generally convex and does not have abrupt drops in slope. The region
from false positive rate of 0.27 to slightly after 0.32 can be considered as ideal
operating region for this IDS. With the increase in false positives beyond 0.27, there
is no abrupt drop in detection rate, indicating a wide operating region with decent
false positive and detection rate. There is a slight concave region in the curve where
false positive rate is 0.37. This is a sign of poor detection mechanism in that region,
but since it is outside the ideal operating region of the IDS where the false positive
rate is already higher, this is not a huge compromise on the effectiveness.

4.4 Effect of r-value on detection and false positive rates
The r values tested ranged from 40% to 80% of the value of n (calculated
from (r/n)*100). The false positive and detection rates against various r value
percentages can be seen in the Figure 4.4. Individual detection rate (at 81.56%) and
average detection rate (at 62.68%) were the maximum when the r value was 40% of
n value. But the average false positive rate was also slightly higher at 30.50%. It is
to be noted that these are values are specific to the NSL-KDD dataset and may not
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Figure 4.3.: ROC curve

always be true for another dataset. Ideal r and n values for a different dataset can
be deduced by similar testing.

Figure 4.4.: False positive and detection rates against percentage of r values over n

Figure 4.5 shows the comparison of false positives and detection for different
r values and constant n and threshold values. This graph shows the direct effect of r
value on the detection rate. The n value was set at 75 and threshold value was set
at 70%. It could be observed that as the r value increases, detection rate decreases

39
and the false positive rate increases. As already seen in Figure 4.1, higher n values
resulted in heap space running out and the program crashing. The insufficient heap
space issue further increased with higher r values. It can be concluded that for the
NSL-KDD dataset, the effectiveness and performance of the IDS decreases beyond
an r percentage of 40%.

Figure 4.5.: False positive and detection rates against percentage of r values over n
(constant n and threshold values)

4.5 Comparison of effectiveness with other IDS systems
The Figure 4.6 shows the ROC curves of the developed IDS along with the
other prominent IDS systems like Snort (Alder et al., 2007), Bro (Paxson, 1999),
Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) proposed in Hwang, Cai, Chen, and Qin
(2007). ROC curves for these three IDS systems were already compared in Hwang
et al. (2007). HIDS is a combination of anomaly-based and signature-based
detection mechanisms and would serve as a proper comparison. As seen in the
figure, Snort and Bro have an operating region with relatively lower detection rates.
This is because the NSL-KDD dataset has over 90% of the attacks in the test
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dataset that is not directly present in the training dataset. This is huge shortcoming
for Snort and Bro IDS systems that are largely signature-based detection systems.
HIDS having a combination of anomaly based and signature based detection
mechanisms, performs better overall compared the other three IDS systems. The
operating range of HIDS has a detection rate around 30% better than Snort and
around 38% better than Bro. In comparison with the developed IDS, HIDS has
almost an identical detection rate range in the operating region before a false
positive rate of 0.32. It is to be noted that the developed IDS has only anomaly
based defenses and uses only self traffic for training, while the other IDS systems
use both self and non-self traffic while training. It could be argued that considering
the above aspects, the developed IDS is relatively more effective than HIDS for
NSL-KDD dataset.

Figure 4.6.: ROC curves - comparison against other IDS systems

4.6 Effectiveness against zero-day attacks
We know that the greatest strength of anomaly-based IDS systems is their
capability to detect newer forms of attacks like zero-day attacks. This makes it
critical for us to study the effectiveness of the developed IDS against such attacks.

41
It is to be noted that the developed IDS uses only self traffic for training and not
non-self traffic. Thus, in the view of the IDS, all the attacks are unknown (like zero
day attacks). This makes the detection rates and false positive rates mentioned
above equally applicable to zero days attacks as it is to any other attack. Even so,
the NSL-KDD dataset has only 568 (out of the total of 22,544 records) of the
non-self instances in the test dataset carried over from the training dataset. That is,
only 2.43% of the entries in the test dataset is comprised of previously known
attacks. Thus it could be argued that, one of the important research goals of
achieving better defenses against zero day attacks was achieved.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY
The previous chapters provided an introduction to this research, discussed
the relevant literature, and also detailed the methodology and results. The
developed IDS performs relatively better on false positive and detection rate fronts,
when compared with other prominent IDS systems when it comes to the NSL-KDD
dataset. Also, the system is based out of the algorithm Elberfeld and Textor (2011)
which achieves linear classification time. Existing negative selection algorithms were
only able to achieve polynomial classification at best. One of the important research
goals of achieving better defenses against zero day attacks was achieved with least
computational overhead for classification. With positive selection and additional
optimizations, we may be able to achieve even better detection rates. Such changes
would enable better usability in real-world environments.

5.1 Future Work
1. Including positive selection capabilities to the detection mechanism would
enable training also based on the non-self traffic and would help further
improve the detection rates
2. This research concentrates on the optimization and improvement of
classification phase in the detection process. Future research has to work
towards improvements on memory and storage optimization fronts in the
training phase
3. To test the developed IDS against other datasets. Note that the same
methodology can be used for testing the IDS against any other labeled dataset

43
4. The various modules of the IDS like the input and network decoder modules
can be implemented in a distributed architecture, across different devices to
improve performance and resilience.
5. Future work can also add semantic aware and state-based techniques for
detection. Techniques like Kong et al. (2011) can be pursued for filtering of
noise in the training data.
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